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 1 Introduction
Pollution prevention and clean technologies have come to the forefront in reducing and
controlling the environmental eﬀects created by ﬁrms. Environmental Agencies (EAs) face
the important challenge of encouraging the adoption of such measures and compelling
compliance with environmental laws and regulations. For this aim, they often design
a deterrence policy based on inspections. This paper contributes to the literature that
analyzes the optimal inspection policy taking into account ﬁrms’ strategic behavior.1 We
build and analyze a model where ﬁrms choose a production technology which, together
with some random event, determines the ﬁnal emission level. That is, we explicitly take
into account the random nature of pollution and its eﬀects on the optimal inspection
policy.
Although ﬁrms can limit emissions of pollutants by deciding the production technology,
by adjusting the mix of outputs and inputs, and through the use of abating technologies,
this control is often not precise. Many factors such as weather, equipment failures, and
human error may cause realized emissions to diﬀer from intended emissions.
We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a clean technology and a
dirty technology. A “clean technology” is a manufacturing process or product technology
that reduces pollution or waste energy use, or material use in comparison with the “dirty
technology”. That is, expected level of emissions when production is carried out with
the clean technology is lower than if the ﬁrm uses the dirty technology. For both tech-
nologies, the realized emission level is random and it is privately observed by the ﬁrm.
The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, monitoring, and
penalties over unreported emissions. The ﬁrm reports an emission level and pays the
taxes associated to it. The true emission level can only be observed (and made veriﬁable)
by the EA after an inspection.
The EA is interested in the expected emission level; it would like ﬁrms to put eﬀort
to incorporate pollution prevention and clean technologies into its production process.
Hence, the EA’s two concerns are whether the ﬁrm adopts the clean technology or not,
and to achieve its goal at the lowest cost. We analyze the optimal monitoring of one ﬁrm
1Cohen (1999) and Sandmo (2000) provide two recent and extensive reviews of the literature.
3when the EA takes into account the random nature of pollution: bad luck may cause a
high level of emissions even when the ﬁrm adopts the clean technology while good luck
may diminish emissions level of a ﬁrm that uses the dirty technology.
We distinguish three cases. First, we assume that the EA knows the ﬁrm’s cost of
adopting the technologies but the technology chosen is not veriﬁable. We show that the
inspection policy on the emission level that induces the ﬁrm to adopt the clean technology
at the lowest cost is a cut-oﬀ strategy where all the reports under the cut-oﬀ are inspected
with the same probability and reports over this cut-oﬀ are not audited. Second, we analyze
situations in which both the technology adopted by the ﬁrm and its cost are non-veriﬁable.
In this case, the EA is forced to use the same monitoring policy for all types of ﬁrm. We
show that ﬁrms with low adoption costs will be induced to switch to the clean technology
while high-cost ﬁrms will keep the dirty one. The optimal policy is then also a cut-oﬀ
policy consisting on the one that would be designed for the “marginal” ﬁrm as if its
emissions distribution was an average between the clean and the dirty technology. Third,
we consider the case where the technology adopted by the ﬁrm is observable, but the cost
encountered by the ﬁrm is not. In this situation, the ﬁrm will be inspected (through a
cut-oﬀ rule) only if it is producing with the dirty technology.
In the three cases, the optimal inspection policy induces the ﬁrm to adopt the clean
technology if the adoption cost is not too high. We compare the conditions under which
the ﬁrm adopts the clean technology with the benchmark case where the EA has all
the information about the ﬁrm (ﬁrst-best). When the technology adopted is private
information for the ﬁrm, the optimal monitoring policy induces the ﬁrm to choose the
clean technology for a smaller set of parameters than the ﬁrst best. In contrast, when
t h ec o s ti sp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o nf o rt h eﬁrm while the technology adopted is veriﬁable, the
ﬁrm may produce with the clean technology for a larger set of parameters than in the ﬁrst
best. That is, the EA may want to push ﬁrms to adopt the clean technology too often to
save monitoring costs.
Several papers have considered that pollution emissions frequently produce stochastic
environmental damages.2 But they have studied diﬀerent aspects from our paper. Some
2For example, the damage from a given amount of eﬄuent released in a river depends on features
which vary temporally, such as seasonal ﬂuctuations in water volume, temperature and turbidity. The
4authors have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of introducing self-reporting
(whereas in our paper is assumed to be in place) on the emission level in situations
where emissions are random. In particular, Innes (1999) analyzes a model where there
are expost beneﬁts of cleaning-up if an environmental accident (high level of pollution)
occurs. In his model, ﬁrms choose the level of care (that can be interpreted as the choice
of a technology), and this care aﬀects the probability of an accident. Innes shows that
when there is no self-reporting a ﬁrm will engage in clean-up only if audited, while the
ﬁrm always cleans-up when self-reporting is in place. Malik (1993) compares the case with
and without self-reporting in a situation where collecting penalties and taxes is costly and
the monitoring technology is imperfect (including both types I and II of errors). In this
framework, self-reporting does not necessarily reduce regulation costs because of costly
sanction.3 Hamilton and Requate (2006) analyze the choice between emission caps and
environmental quality standards when emissions are random. They show that when ﬁrms
invest in abatement equipment, an emission standard induces over-investment relative to
the socially optimal resource allocation, while under-investment tends to occur under an
ambient environmental policy.
The model analyzed in this paper also contrasts with most of the models that study
the optimal inspection policy, since they assume that the ﬁrm decides directly its (non-
random) emission level (see, for example, Harford, 1978 and 1987, Sandmo, 2000, and
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2006). In Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006),
we show that the EA optimal strategy induces a corner solution, in the sense that there
are always ﬁr m st h a td on o tc o m p l yw i t ht h ee n v i r o n m e n t a lo b j e c t i v ea n do t h e r st h a td o
comply but all of them evade the environmental taxes. Concerning the optimality of the
use of environmental taxes, Macho-Stadler (2007) shows that it is less costly to achieve
any level of compliance through taxes than using standards or tradable permits.
Finally, some previous papers have analyzed how the regulatory regime via emissions
taxes or standards may aﬀect ﬁrms’ adoption of emissions abatement technology (see,
for example, Downing and White, 1986, Milliman, 1989, and Tarui and Polasky, 2005).
eﬀect of airborne emissions on air quality depends on prevailing atmospheric conditions, such as thermal
structure, circulation, pressure, and humidity.
3See also Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Livernois and McKenna (1999).
5Our paper is complementary to these contributions as we show how to design a monitor-
ing policy, in environments where emissions cannot be identiﬁed without inspection, to
maximize ﬁrms’ adoption at the lowest cost.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and analyze
a ﬁrm’s report given its technology and the inspection policy. Section 3 deals with the
optimal policy that induces a single ﬁrm to switch to the clean technology, under three
diﬀerent scenarios concerning the observability of the change in technology and the cost
of switching technologies. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss the optimal inspection
policy when the EA faces a family of ﬁrms. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Firm’s report under emission taxes
We model situations where ﬁrm’s emissions are random, but they are inﬂuenced by the
ﬁrm’s choice of technology. A ﬁrm’s level of emissions (or damages) e is distributed
in the interval [e,e] according to the distribution function F(e;E), where E denotes
the production technology chosen by the ﬁrm. We assume that F(·;E) is continuously
diﬀerentiable and that f(e;E)=∂F(e;E)/∂e > 0 on [e,e]. The cost of the technology E
is sunk.
We assume that emissions are taxed according to a linear schedule, with marginal tax
rate t. Therefore, the emissions costs of a ﬁrm that produces a level of emissions e,a n d
pays the taxes corresponding to e (i.e., there is perfect monitoring of emissions) are te.





We will consider situations where emissions levels are ﬁrm’s private information. How-
ever, emissions can be assessed if the ﬁrm is monitored by the EA. The ﬁrm is asked to
send a report z ∈ [e,e] on its emissions level, once the emissions are realized. The ﬁrm
may choose a report z that does not coincide with the true emissions level e.
The EA has two instruments to control ﬁrm’s emissions: monitoring and penalties.
We denote by α(z) the probability that the EA will audit the emissions of the ﬁrm when
it reports a level of emissions z.T h es t r a t e g yα(·) followed by the EA is decided previous
6t ot h ec h o i c eo ft h et e c h n o l o g yE, that is, we assume that the EA is able to commit
to its monitoring strategy. If the ﬁrm is monitored and its level of emissions is found
to be higher than its report, then a penalty is imposed to the ﬁrm. For simplicity, we
assume that the penalty is linear in the underreported emissions. We also assume that
the marginal penalty rate, denoted θ, is exogenous. Parameter θ includes the taxes due
to the EA, hence θ>t .
The ﬁrm’s expected costs when the emissions are e, the report is z and the monitoring
strategy is α(·) are:
c(e,z;α(·)) = tz + α(z)θ[e − z].
The timing of the decisions is as follows. First, the EA decides on the monitoring
strategy α(·). Second, the ﬁrm chooses the technology E at a certain cost. Emissions
are realized according to the density function f(e;E). Third, after having observed the
realized emissions e,t h eﬁrm decides on the report z and pays the taxes tz.T h eﬁrm is
monitored with probability α(z). If it is audited and it has underreported, then the ﬁrm
pays the penalty θ[e − z].
The ﬁrm chooses z to minimize its costs c(e,z;α(·)), as a function of the realized
emissions e. That is, at the last stage, the ﬁrm chooses z(e).W e d e n o t e c(e;α(·)) =
c(e,z(e);α(·)) ﬁrm’s expected costs when its emissions level is e and it makes the report
that minimizes its costs.
We start with two results that provide useful information concerning ﬁrm’s behavior
with respect to the report.
Lemma 1 (i) A Firm never reports more than their emissions.
(ii) If α(z) >t / θ ,t h e naﬁrm never reports z when e>z .
(iii) When its emissions level is e,t h e naﬁrm reports honestly only if α(z) ≥ t/θ for
all z ∈ [e,e).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following. Given the tax rate t and the penalty
rate θ, a monitoring probability of t/θ is enough to spur honest behavior. Therefore, a ﬁrm
never submits a report z lower than its real emission e if reporting z leads to inspection
with a probability higher than t/θ. On the other hand, the ﬁrm will not report honestly
if it can submit a report z<ethat is monitored with a probability lower than t/θ.
7According to Lemma 1, the EA will not have incentives to inspect any report with a
probability higher than t/θ, since monitoring is costly. Therefore, t/θ is an upper bound
for the optimal monitoring probability.
Proposition 1 Given the monitoring policy α(·),i ft h er e p o r tz(e) minimizes ﬁrm’s costs
when the emissions level is e,t h e n :
α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e,a n d (1)




Moreover, if (1) and (2) hold, then z(e) minimizes ﬁrm’s expected costs over the set of
all possible equilibrium reports, i.e., {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e,e]} when the emissions
level is e.
For any given report, the penalty that the ﬁrm pays if it is caught underreporting
increases with its realized pollution level. Therefore, the higher the emission level, the
more incentives the ﬁrm has to chose reports with low monitoring probability. This
explains that α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e. As to the expected costs, equation (2) states
that the cost borne by the ﬁrm when its emissions are e is the integral of the monitoring
probability of every level below e. This equation is also explained by the ﬁrm’s possibility
of underreporting. By inspecting with probability α(z(x)),t h eE Am a k e st h eﬁrm pay
an expected penalty of θα(z(x)) when its emission level is x.B u t t h i s s i m i l a r l y a ﬀects
the ﬁrm’s expected costs when it underreports for any emission higher than x,s i n c ez(x)
is always a possible report. Hence, equation (2) provides the expected cost borne by the
ﬁrm when its emission level is e.
Note that, although the tax rate t does not explicitly appear in equation (2), it plays
a role as it sets the upper bound for the probability α(.). The rate t is only important for
those emission levels for which the ﬁrm reports honestly. For example, if the report z(e)
is such that α(z(e)) = t/θ for all e ≤ ˆ e and α(z(e)) <t / θotherwise, then we can write




We can use Proposition 1 to compute ﬁrm’s expected costs of using the technology E:
8Proposition 2 Given the monitoring policy α(·),i ft h er e p o r ts t r a t e g yz(·) minimizes
ﬁrm’s costs for all emissions levels, then:
C(E;α(·)) = c(e;α(·)) + θ
Z e
e
α(z(e))[1 − F(e;E)]de. (3)
In this section, we have analyzed the ﬁrm’s strategic behavior concerning its report,
once it knows the pollution level. We have computed the ﬁrm’s expected cost due to the
environmental policy of taxes, inspection, and penalties. We have developed the analysis
for an exogenous monitoring policy. In the next section, we characterize the optimal
monitoring policy from the EA’s point of view.
3 Optimal monitoring
We analyze a situation where two production technologies are possible: ED and EC.
Technology EC is a cleaner but also more expensive technology than ED (subscript C
stands for “clean” and D for “dirty”). We assume that the ﬁrm is initially producing
according to ED and we denote by ∆ the cost of switching from the dirty technology to





In this paper, we assume that the environmental policy is based on taxes over reported
emissions, monitoring, and penalties. For example, we do not consider the possibility
t h a tt h eG o v e r n m e n to rt h eE Am i g h tg i v et h eﬁrm a subsidy if it switches to a clean
t e c h n o l o g y ,o rt h a ti ti m p o s e saﬁxed penalty to ﬁrms keeping the dirty technology. When
the technology adopted by the ﬁrm is not veriﬁable (i.e., only the ﬁrm knows the expected
level of pollution of the technologies), the previous policies based on ﬁxed subsidies or
4We can also consider situations where the ﬁrm is not using any of the two technologies and it has to
chose one of them. In this case, ∆ is interpreted as the diﬀerence in costs of the technologies, i.e., the
cost to adopt the former instead of the later.
5In our framework, the emissions from both technologies are equally diﬃcult to inspect. Some authors
have analyzed technologies that can aﬀect the observability of ﬁrms’ emissions. Heyes (1993) considers
am o d e lw h e r eﬁrms may invest in decreasing “inspectability”. Millock et al. (2002) studies a choice of
technology that aﬀects the veriﬁability of emission: adopting the technology allows nonpoint sources to
become point sources.
9penalties cannot be implemented, as they require the EA to be able to check whether a
change to a clean technology has taken place. Similarly, these policies are not possible in
those environments where “clean” or “dirty” refer to the care that ﬁrms take with respect
to the maintenance of the existing technology or to avoiding mistakes. In this sense,
w ei n t e r p r e tt h a taﬁrm uses a clean technology when it devotes (monetary and human)
resources to the good functioning of its equipment, while a ﬁrm produces according to a
dirty technology when it does not care much about the correct running of the equipment,
thus leading to higher expected level of emissions. On the other hand, when the EA can
easily check whether a ﬁrm has adopted a more environmentally friendly technology (or
whether it is using the technology trying to minimize pollution), a ﬁx e dr e w a r do rp e n a l t y
can be optimal. Therefore, our analysis applies to those situations where, due to political,
technical, or moral hazard constraints, a policy based on ﬁxed subsidies or penalties is
not possible.
Given the policy announced by the Government and the EA involving taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties over unreported emissions, the ﬁrm will
choose the clean technology if and only if its total expected costs are lower than using
the dirty technology, that is, if C(EC;α(·)) + ∆ ≤ C(ED;α(·)). This inequality can be











The monitoring policy decided by the EA strongly inﬂuences the choice between EC
and ED. We normalize the cost of an inspection to 1, and we look for the optimal
monitoring policy, that is, the policy that minimizes EA’s monitoring costs.
It might be the case that the ﬁrm chooses technology ED for any possible monitoring
strategy. Indeed, if the diﬀerence in cost ∆ is very large, the ﬁrm may prefer paying all
the expected taxes corresponding to the emissions induced by ED rather than adopting
the clean technology. In what follows, we will assume that the set of functions α(·) that
lead the ﬁrm to choose EC is not empty, which is equivalent to state that the toughest
policy (α(z)=t/θ for all z)l e a d st h eﬁrm to use the clean technology.







10Although part of the analysis of the optimal policy is developed without assumptions
concerning the distribution functions F(e;EC) and F(e;ED), the complete characteriza-
tion of the policies will require further assumptions. In particular, we will assume that
the density functions f(e;EC) and f(e;ED) are linear. Also, to help notation, we will
normalize [e,e]=[ 0 ,1].
Assumption 2: f(e;EC)=a +2[ 1− a]e, f(e;ED)=b +2[ 1− b]e, for all e ∈ [0,1],
where a,b ∈ (0,2), and a>b .
Note that the property F(1;EC)=F(1;ED)=1characterizes the slope of the linear
functions f(1;EC) and f(1;ED), once we choose the independent terms a and b.M o r e o v e r ,
the idea that EC is a cleaner technology than ED is reﬂected in the inequality a>b .A l s o
note that although Assumption 2 is restrictive, it allows the ﬂexibility of dealing with
distribution functions F(e;EC) and F(e;ED) that may be linear (a =1or b =1 )c o n c a v e
(a>1 or b>1), or convex (a<1 or b<1). On the other hand, it is a strong assumption
that is helpful to identify a simple monitoring policy. We will comment later on the
properties of the optimal monitoring policy in more general setups.
In the next subsection, we assume that both the ﬁrm and the EA know the cost
∆ a n dw ew i l lc h a r a c t e r i z et h ep o l i c yt h a tt h eE Ap u t si np l a c ei fi tw a n t st oi n d u c e
the ﬁrm to adopt technology EC. That is, we look for the cheapest policy, in terms of
monitoring costs, to achieve EC for a given ∆. In subsection 3.2,w er e l a xt h ea s s u m p t i o n
that the EA knows ∆ and look for the optimal monitoring policy when ∆ is ﬁrm’s private
information. Finally, in subsection 3.3 we will analyze the scenario where the ﬁrm has
private information concerning ∆ but the EA can check whether the ﬁrm has adopted the
clean technology.
3.1 Optimal monitoring to achieve a clean technology when the
cost ∆ is public information
We assume that the EA is concerned about inducing the ﬁrm to adopt the clean tech-
nology. In this section, we consider a situation where the EA observes the cost ∆,b u t
is uninformed about the technology that the ﬁrm adopts and about the realized emission
11level. The EA receives the report z form the ﬁrm. The optimization problem of the








s.t.: α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e
α(z(e)) ∈ [0,t/θ] for all e ∈ [e,e]











We can simplify program [P] as follows. We do not take into account the constraint
that z(e) minimizes c(e,z;EC;α(·)), and we denote the function α(z(e)) as β(e).O n c e
we identify β(e),w ew i l lu s eP r o p o s i t i o n1t od e c o m p o s et h ef u n c t i o nβ(e) into the
optimal monitoring function α(z) and the report function z(e). The optimal β(·) solves







s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e











Next Proposition states an important general property of the solution to program [P0]:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 and for any distribution function F(.),t h e r ee x i s t s
as o l u t i o nβ(·) to [P0] that takes on at most one value diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ.
Given Proposition 3 and β(e) nonincreasing in e,t h e r ee x i s td ∈ (0,t/θ), e1 and e2,
with e ≤ e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e, such that the optimal function β(e) has the following shape:
β(e)=t/θfor all e ∈ [e,e 1],
β(e)=γ for all e ∈ (e1,e 2),
β(e)=0for all e ∈ [e2,e].
12Proposition 3 shows that the optimal monitoring policy is very simple independently on
the shape of the distribution functions. Proposition 4 goes a step forward and shows that,
under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal policy is quite simple. To state this Proposition,
let us deﬁne the function h(e) as follows:
h(e) ≡ f(e;E
C) −
F(e;EC) − F(e;ED) R e
e [F(x;EC) − F(x;ED)]dx
F(e;E
C).
The function h(e) plays an important role in the proof of Proposition 4, and allow us to
deﬁne a cut-oﬀ level. It is easy to check that, under Assumption 2, h(e) is ﬁrst negative
and then positive. We denote by e∗ the cut-oﬀ level such that h(e) < 0 if e<e ∗ and
h(e) > 0 if e>e ∗, that is, e∗ is deﬁned by h(e∗)=0 .6 Easy computations show that e∗
is an increasing function of a.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.






de, then a solution β(e) to [P0] is
β(e)=b γ for all e ∈ [e,e
∗),
β(e)=0for all e ∈ [e
∗,e],









de = ∆. (5)






de, then a solution β(e) to [P0] is
β(e)=t/θ for all e ∈ [e,b e),
β(e)=0for all e ∈ [b e,e],














2(1−a) ∈ (0,1) when a 6=1 .
13The optimal monitoring policy is very simple. We here highlight its main character-
istics. First, the EA will always monitor, at least, the reports corresponding to all the
emission levels lower than the cut-oﬀ value e∗. N o t et h a tt h ec u t - o ﬀ e∗ is usually high;
for the intermediate case a =1 , e∗ =3 /4. Second, the probability of monitoring is the
same for all the reports subject to audit. Third, as long as the incentive problem is not
very acute, in the sense that adopting the clean technology is not very costly, the EA will
only monitor when the realized emission level is lower than e∗. Finally, when the incen-
tive problem is very severe, the monitoring probability is the highest possible, among the
sensible ones, (i.e., β = t/θ) for all the reports subject to audit.
Once we know the optimal function β(e), we can use Proposition 1 to state the optimal
monitoring policy as a function of the report, α(z),a sw e l la sﬁrms’ reporting behavior
given the optimal monitoring policy, z(e). Proposition 5 characterizes these functions.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.






de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α
∗(z)=b γ for all z ∈ [e,z
∗),
α
∗(z)=0for all z ∈ [z
∗,e],w h e r e
z





e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
.
Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z),t h eﬁrm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e)=e for all e ∈ [e,e
∗),
z(e)=z
∗ for all e ∈ [e
∗,e].






de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α
∗(z)=t/θ for all z ∈ [e,b e),
α
∗(z)=0for all z ∈ [b e,e].
Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z),t h eﬁrm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e)=e for all e ∈ [e,b e),
z(e)=b e for all e ∈ [b e,e].
14We now explain the intuitions behind Propositions 4 and 5. The EA’s objective is to
dissuade the ﬁrm from using the dirty technology at the least possible (monitoring) cost.
To “convince” the ﬁrm, the EA must choose a monitoring strategy that makes the ﬁrm
bear high expected environmental costs (also taking into account the penalties) if it uses
the dirty technology, and low expected costs if it produces according to the clean one.
A dirty technology has a higher probability to p r od u c eh i g he m i s s i o nl e v e l st h a nac l e a n
technology. For the case of linear density functions over the interval [0,1] (Assumption 2),
the clean technology has higher density for e ∈ [0,1/2) and lower density for e ∈ (1/2,1].
Therefore, in terms of dissuasion, the EA would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to make the ﬁrm pay
as much as possible (and that can be achieved by monitoring with high probability)
when realized emissions are high and as little as possible when realized emissions are low.
However, the EA does not observe the realized emission level, only the ﬁrm does. The
EA only receives the ﬁrm’s report.
When emissions are not public information, equation (2) in Proposition 1 states that
the cost borne by the ﬁrm when the emission level is eo is the integral of the monitoring
probability of every level below eo. That is, increasing the probability of monitoring the
report corresponding to a level e aﬀects in the same way the cost suﬀered for every emission
level higher than e. Hence, monitoring the report corresponding to a high emission level,
say e0 > 1/2, has good incentive consequences concerning the decision to use a clean
technology, as it aﬀects the cost borne for every realized emission e ≥ e0.O n t h eo t h e r
hand, monitoring the report corresponding to a low emission level, say e00 < 1/2,h a sm i x e d
incentive consequences since it aﬀects the cost associated to both high (every e>1/2)
and low (every e ∈ [e0,1/2)) emission levels.
The diﬃculty is that, from equation (1) in Proposition 1, the EA is constraint to use
a monitoring probability nonincreasing in the emission level. That is, if the EA wants to
monitor the (ﬁrm’s optimal) report corresponding to a certain level of emissions eo,t h e n
it is forced to monitor the reports corresponding to all the levels e<e o with, at least, the
same frequency.
To understand how the EA solves the previous diﬃculty, consider also that ∆ is
small in such a way that inducing the ﬁrm to switch to the clean technology is easy
(Region (a) in Proposition 4). Could it make sense for the EA to monitor only the reports
15corresponding to low emission levels? The answer is no. The EA does better monitoring
reports chosen by a larger range of emission levels (including levels higher than 1/2)w i t h
lower probability. The cost paid by the higher emission levels will be the same, while the
cost borne by the lower emission levels will be lower, which gives the ﬁrm more incentives
to adopt the clean technology (more precisely, it will allow the EA to save on monitoring
costs). Is it optimal for the EA to set a full ﬂat policy (i.e., e∗ = e)? The answer to this
question is also negative because monitoring the report corresponding to emission levels
very close to e only aﬀects the payment of a very small interval of emissions.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ed e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf(e;EC) is uniform, i.e., a =1 ,t h et r a d e -
oﬀ leads to a ﬂat policy consisting in auditing the reports corresponding to every e<
3/4=e∗ with the same (small) probability. When f(e;EC) is not uniform, the argument
is more complex, as switching monitoring probabilities from one level to the other has
consequences in terms of monitoring costs. This is why when the distribution function
f(e;EC) is decreasing, it is optimal to state an even ﬂatter technology (e∗ > 3/4), while
t h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n sw h e nf(e;EC) is increasing.7
The previous discussion also allows to comment on the generality of the results with
respect to the shape of the distribution functions. First, according to our arguments,
monitoring every single emission with some probability (i.e., e2 = e) is not optimal for
general distribution functions. Second, the property that the monitoring policy is ﬂat for
quite a wide range of emissions can be stated under quite reasonable hypotheses. For
7It is worth comparing our context with situations in which the objective of the agency is to raise
the largest amount of taxes, for a given technology. In such latest situations, the agency is much less
interested in focusing in high-emission levels. For example, in the tax evasion literature it is assumed
that the distribution of income is given and the objective of the enforcement agency is to maximize the
collected revenues (taxes plus penalties). In this case, the optimal policy consists in auditing all the
taxpayers reporting incomes lower than a certain cut-oﬀ income with a probability high enough so that
those reports will happen to be truthful, while the taxpayers earning higher incomes will report the cut-oﬀ
income and will not be subjet to audit. The main intuition for this result is the one we have provided in
the main text: putting pressure over the report corresponding to an emission level increases the revenue
collected from every higher level. That is, it is beneﬁcial to concentrate the monitoring in the lowest levels
of income (with the maximum probability t/θ). Some papers in the tax evasion literature are Reinganum
and Wilde (1985), Scotchmer (1987), Sánchez and Sobel (1993), and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(1997).
16example, assume that F(e;EC) >F(e;ED) for all e ∈ (e,e), F(e;EC) −F(e;ED) is ﬁrst
increasing and then decreasing in e,a n dF(e;EC) is concave in e. Under these necessary
conditions, it is possible to prove that there exists a cut-oﬀ value e# that lies in the
region of emissions where F(e;EC) − F(e;ED) is decreasing such that β(e) is constant
for all e<e #. In particular, the reports corresponding to all emission levels e<e # are
monitored with a low probability when the cost of adopting the clean technology is low.
On the other hand, it seems more diﬃcult to propose general necessary conditions to
establish the precise form of the optimal monitoring strategy for higher emission levels.
Although we know that the highest levels are never monitored, it is diﬃcult to prove more
general results.
Next, Corollary 1 states the monitoring cost ECost(∆) of the implementation of the
clean technology as a function of the parameters of the model.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(I) Expected monitoring costs ECost are the following:












e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
.












(II) Expected monitoring costs are increasing in the diﬀerence ∆ and they are decreasing
with the penalty rate θ; they are higher the less clean is technology EC and the less dirty
is technology ED. Finally, expected costs are increasing in the ratio t/θ in Region (b).
We now explain the comparative statics in Corollary 1. First, the higher the cost ∆
for the ﬁrm to switch the to clean technology, the higher the monitoring cost required to







where e2 = e∗ in Region (a) and e2 = b e in Region (b). Second, a higher penalty rate θ
makes it easier to “convince” the ﬁrm, hence it decreases the EA’s cost. Third, the larger
17(in terms of expected pollution) the diﬀerence between the two technologies, the more the
EA’s monitoring can target the dirty technology, which also decreases monitoring costs.
Finally, an increase in the tax rate t forces the EA to increase the monitoring probability
if it wants the ﬁrm to be honest when the level of pollution is low (which is the optimal
policy in Region (b)). Therefore, the monitoring costs increase with t. That is, a though
policy in terms of penalty rate and (in Region (b)) a soft policy in terms of tax rate help
in keeping low monitoring costs.
3.2 Optimal policy when the cost ∆ is not observable by the EA
We now address the EA’s optimal policy when the cost ∆ of adopting the clean technology
is the ﬁrm’s own private information. We model this situation as follows. The ﬁrm
knows ∆ while the EA only has statistical information about it. The EA believes that




;w ed e n o t eb yG(∆) the distribution function of ∆. The EA cares about expected
pollution, hence its concern is whether the ﬁrm chooses the clean or the dirty technology.
The EA’s policy is anonymous, i.e., every type of ﬁrm is subject to the same monitoring
policy.8
Inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint (4) makes it clear that incentives
to switch to the clean technology are strictly decreasing with the switching cost. That is,
for a given monitoring policy, if a ﬁrm with parameter ∆ adopts the clean technology, it
will also adopt it if its parameter is ∆0 < ∆. Therefore, any policy α(.) will induce the





Next proposition characterizes the policy that minimizes monitoring costs when the
EA wants the ﬁrm to switch to EC if ∆ lies in the interval [0,∆n]. The policy is qualitative
8We can also see the analysis developed in this and next subsection as the study of the optimal
monitoring policy when the EA faces a family of ﬁrms characterized by the cost parameter ∆. The
EA has some beliefs about the distribution of the adoption cost in the family of ﬁrms, beliefs that are
reﬂected in the function G(∆). However, it does not know the adoption cost of any particular ﬁrm. Next
propositions and corollaries have an immediate interpretation in this context.
9The letter n in ∆n stands for (technology adoption) non veriﬁcable. In next subsection, the adoption
is supposed veriﬁable and we will use ∆v.
18t h es a m ea st h eo n es t a t e di nP r o p o s i t i o n5 ,a l t h o u g ht h ec u t - o ﬀ levels are diﬀerent. The
precise value for the parameters en,z n, b en, and b γ
n that appear in Proposition 6 are given
in the Appendix. They do not correspond to the optimal cut-oﬀ levels whenever the EA
would like to give incentives to switch technology to a ﬁrm with parameter ∆n.T h a t
is, the homogeneous monitoring policy does not coincide with the optimal policy for the
“marginal ﬁrm” ∆n. It would correspond to a ﬁrm with adoption costs of ∆n,w h o s e
incentives are given by the diﬀerence between the distribution functions F(e;EC) and
F(e;ED), but whose actual emissions are given by the (average) distribution function
G(∆n)F(e;EC)+[ 1− G(∆n)]F(e;ED) instead of F(e;EC).
Proposition 6 Suppose the ﬁrm’s cost parameter ∆ is distributed according to G(∆),i t
is ﬁrm’s private information, and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the EA wants the ﬁrm to
adopt EC if ∆ ∈ [0,∆n] and cannot observe the technology choice:






de, then the following policy αn(z) is optimal:
α
n(z)=b γ
n for all z ∈ [e,z
n),
α
n(z)=0for all z ∈ [z
n,e].






de, then the following policy αn(z) is optimal:
α
n(z)=t/θ for all z ∈ [e,b e
n),
α
n(z)=0for all z ∈ [b e
n,e].
The policy αn(z) stated in Proposition 6 requires monitoring all reports below a cut-
oﬀ value (en or b en depending on the region) with the same probability, that is, a large
range of (low) reports are monitored with a uniform probability, while high reports are
never monitored. The intuitions behind the optimality of this policy are similar to the
one discussed after Propositions 4 and 5.
The expected monitoring cost of the policy αn(z) depends on the interval [0,∆n] of
types of ﬁrms that the EA wants to adopt EC. The larger the interval, i.e., the higher
∆n, the higher the expected cost ECostn([0,∆n]) when the adoption of the technology is
not observable. Using the envelop theorem in program [PM] in the proof of Proposition















where e2 = en and γ = b γ
n in Region (a) and e2 = b en and γ = t/θ in Region (b). To
explain expression (6), note that an increase in the cut-oﬀ level ∆n has two eﬀects on
the monitoring costs. First, for a ﬁrm with a higher switching cost to adopt EC, the
monitoring probability must increase. This aﬀects the ﬁrm independently on its type and
is reﬂected in the second term in the right-hand side of (6). Second, there are types of
ﬁr m st h a tw e r ek e e p i n gED before the increase in the cut-oﬀ and are adopting EC after
the change. A ﬁrm using EC is monitored more often (although its expected payment is
lower) than if it keeps ED ( t h i si sd u et ot h ep r o p e r t yt h a t the monitoring probability
should be non-decreasing in realized emission, see Proposition 1). Both eﬀects go in the
same direction: inducing more proportion of ﬁrms to adopt EC increases the monitoring
costs.
How is the optimal ∆n∗ decided? If the ﬁrm’s cost ∆ was public information (and
the ﬁrm’s technology veriﬁa b l e ) ,t h eG o v e r n m e n t( o rt h eE A )w o u l dw e i g h tb e n e ﬁts of
adopting technology EC due to the reduction in pollution against costs of adoption,
∆. This balance would determine the optimal ∆∗ below which the ﬁrm should (from a
social point of view) adopt EC.W h e n t h e ﬁrm has private information about ∆,t h e n
the Government also takes into account the monitoring cost. One natural form for the








where B(G(∆n) is an increasing and concave function measuring the beneﬁts due to the
ﬁrms’ adoption of EC when the switching cost is lower than ∆n and κ is the weight the
Government gives to ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Given that ECostn([0,∆n]) is increasing in ∆n, it is immediate that the optimal
decision in this case will involve a level ∆n < ∆∗, that is, the expected level of pollution
will be higher than the ﬁrst-best level of pollution:
10The optimal solution of program [PM] always involves e1 = e.
20Corollary 2 Suppose the cost parameter ∆ and the technology adopted are the ﬁrm’s
own private information. Then, the optimal monitoring policy induces the ﬁrm to adopt
technology EC for an interval of parameters [0,∆n∗] that is smaller than the ﬁrst-best
interval [0,∆∗].
3.3 Optimal monitoring when the technology adopted by the
ﬁrm is veriﬁable but ∆ is not
In this subsection, we study the environments where the EA can easily verify the tech-
nology adopted by the ﬁrm. However, it does not know the adoption costs ∆.
Given that the EA is not concerned about the environmental taxes raised, the optimal
policy in this case involves not monitoring at all the ﬁrm if it decides to switch to EC.
Therefore, the ﬁrm can “buy” immunity from environmental taxes by adopting the clean
technology. For similar reasons as in the previous subsection, for any given monitoring
policy (that will only be applied to the ﬁrm if it keeps ED)t h eﬁrm adopts EC if its
parameter ∆ lies in an interval [0,∆v]. What is the optimal monitoring policy for the
ﬁrm when it adopts ED? It needs to give incentives for the ﬁrm to switch to EC even
when its costs are ∆v and the distribution of emissions of those ﬁrms that are monitored
is F(e;ED). Therefore:
Proposition 7 Suppose the ﬁrm’s cost parameter ∆ is distributed according to G(∆),i t
is ﬁrm’s private information, and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the EA wants the ﬁrm to
adopt EC if ∆ ∈ [0,∆v] and can observe the technology choice:
(i) If the ﬁrm adopts EC,i ti sn o tm o n i t o r e d .
(ii) If the ﬁrm adopts ED, is audited according to the policy found in Proposition 5
for a ﬁrm with adoption costs of ∆v.
The monitoring policy will only be applied to the ﬁrm if it uses ED, which happens




. Moreover, the policy applied is the one
that would be optimal if the EA would face a ﬁrm with “known” adoption cost of ∆v.
Therefore, the expected monitoring costs ECostv([0,∆v]) to achieve ﬁrm’s adoption of
21EC for switching costs in [0,∆v] when the technology used by the ﬁrm is veriﬁable, are:
ECost
v([0,∆










e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
,















Consider Region (a) (the qualitative properties in Region (b) are similar). It is imme-
diate that:
∂ECostv([0,∆v])







e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
.
As it was the case in the previous section, an increase in ∆v has two eﬀects on the
monitoring costs. The monitoring probability must increase to “convince” the ﬁrm more
often to adopt EC. But, the probability that the ﬁrm is monitored is lower, as it switches
to EC more often. That is, there is an eﬀect (the positive term in the previous equation)
that makes the monitoring cost increase, while another eﬀect (the negative term) goes in
the sense of decreasing monitoring costs. In fact, there are environments where there is
too much adoption of clean technology compared with the ﬁrst-best situation.11
Corollary 3 Suppose the cost parameter ∆ is the ﬁrm’s own private information and that
the adoption of the technology is veriﬁable. Then, the optimal monitoring policy induces
the ﬁrm to adopt technology EC for an interval of parameters [0,∆v∗] that may be larger
or shorter than the ﬁrst-best interval [0,∆∗].
For example, consider ﬁrms’ decision whether to adopt renewable energy processes
(burning biomass) instead of processes based on fossil energy. The adoption of either
process is easy to check, while the actual extra cost due to switching to renewable energy
use may be diﬃcult to asses by the EA. To give the ﬁrms incentives to adopt clean
processes, the EA will monitor the pollution of fossil energy plants. Will the optimal
monitoring policy lead to too many or too few renewable plants? On the one hand, the
11For example, there is too much adoption if g(∆) is uniform and ∆∗ > ∆/2.
22cost of the monitoring should imply a lower-than-optimal “ﬁrms’ eﬀort”, that is, too little
adoption of the clean plants. However, on the other hand, monitoring is only applied
to those ﬁrms that still use fossil energy. This gives the EA an extra motivation to
monitor, as tougher monitoring makes the number of monitored ﬁrms decrease. As the
previous corollary shows, the optimal policy may imply overswitching or underswitching
to renewable energy processes.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We have considered a situation where the environmental policy is based on taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties. We have assumed that emissions are ﬁrm’s
private information and that they depend on a ﬁrm’s decision (adopting the clean or the
dirty technology) and some random elements. The added value of our paper lies in the
analysis of the optimal monitoring policy when this random characteristic is present. We
have developed the analysis in diﬀerent scenarios depending on whether the technology
adopted by the ﬁrm is veriﬁable or not, and on whether the EA knows the cost of adopting
the clean technology. In all the cases, the optimal policy is a cut-oﬀ policy, where all
r e p o r t sb e l o wt h et h r e s h o l da r ei n s p e c t e dw i t ht h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t y ,w h i l er e p o r t sa b o v e
t h et h r e s h o l da r en o tm o n i t o r e d .W eh a v ea l s os h o w nt h a ti ft h ea d o p t i o no ft h et e c h n o l o g y
is ﬁrms’ private information, too few ﬁrms will adopt the clean technology under the
optimal monitoring policy. However, this is not necessarily true if the EA can check the
technology adopted.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, reporting more than the emissions is never optimal, since the
expected payment is always higher. Second, if e>zand α(z) >t / θ ,thenc(e,z;α(·)) =
tz + α(z)θ[e − z] >t z+ t[e − z],w h i c hi st h ep a y m e n tt h eﬁrm would make if it would
report e. Therefore, reporting z is not optimal. Finally, by similar reasons, reporting e is
not optimal when α(z) <t / θfor some z ∈ [e,e).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Consider two emissions levels e1 and e2 with e1 >e 2 and
23the optimal reports corresponding to these levels, z(e1) and z(e2).G i v e n t h a t t h e ﬁrm
prefers reporting z(e1) than z(e2) when the emissions level is e1, and viceversa, we have:
c(e1;α(·)) = tz(e1)+α(z(e1))θ[e1 − z(e1)] ≤ tz(e2)+α(z(e2))θ[e1 − z(e2)],
c(e2;α(·)) = tz(e2)+α(z(e2))θ[e2 − z(e2)] ≤ tz(e1)+α(z(e1))θ[e2 − z(e1)].
These equations imply:
α(z(e1))θ[e1 − e2] ≤ c(e1;α(·)) − c(e2;α(·)) ≤ α(z(e2))θ[e1 − e2]. (7)
First, since e1 − e2 > 0, (7) requires that α(z(e1)) ≤ α(z(e2)), i.e., α(z(e)) is nonin-
creasing in e. Second, α(z(e)) nonincreasing and (7) imply that c(e;α(·)) is diﬀerentiable
in e almost everywhere, with
dc(e;α(·))
de
= α(z(e))θ almost everywhere.
Equation (2) immediately follows.
Finally, assume (1) and (2) hold. Then, a ﬁrm with emissions level e reporting z(eo)




















e [α(z(x)) − α(z(eo))]dx ≥ 0.
Therefore, z(e) is optimal in {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e,e]}.








































Equation (3) immediately follows.
24P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Consider a solution β
∗(·) to program [P0] and B∗ the
optimal budget. We claim that β












s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e






Indeed, if a function β
0(·) would exist involving a higher value for the solution, β
∗(·)
would not be the solution to [P0]: the EA could use β
00(·) that coincides with β
0(·) until













00(e)=0for all e>e o. This policy would be cheaper than β
0(·), hence it would cost
less than B∗, which is not possible.
We can now use known results (see, for example, Step 4 in the proof of Proposition 1
in Sánchez and Sobel, 1991) to state that there exists a solution to [P00] that takes on at
most one value diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ.










































We start by proving some claims.
Claim 1:We can restrict attention to policies where e2 < e.
To prove Claim 1, consider the set of policies characterized by (e1,e 2,γ),w i t he1 < e.
We do the analysis ﬁxing the level of e1.T h ep a r a m e t e rγ is given by (8), that is,
γ =
1 R e2























F(e2;EC) − F(e1;EC) R e2
e1 [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
,
25where A is a positive constant that does not depend on e2 (it is the second factor in the







Hence, m0(e2 = e) > 0 given Assumption 2. This implies that, at the optimum, it is
always the case that the cost is minimized for a value of e2 lower than e.
Claim 2:A policy such that e1 = e2 <e ∗ is not optimal.
We consider the policies of the form β(e)=γ for all e ∈ [e,e e) and β(e)=0 for all
e ∈ [e e,e], for which (8) holds. In this class of policies, we consider a marginal change in






F(e e;EC) − F(e e;ED)
¤
R h e
e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
.
The cost of any policy in this class is γF(e e;EC). Hence, the change in cost due to the
proposed marginal change is F(e e;EC)∂γ + γf(e e;EC)∂e e = h(e e)γ∂e e. By Assumption 2,
h(e e) < 0 given that e e<e ∗. Therefore, a marginal increase in e e would reduce the cost.
Therefore, a policy with γ = t/θ (i.e., e1 = e2)c a n n o tb eo p t i m a ls i n c et h e r ei sr o o mt o
increase e e and decrease γ in a proﬁtable way, which proves Claim 2.
Claim 3:A policy such that e1 <e 2 is not optimal when e1 <e ∗.
We follow a similar path as in Claim 2. Consider the class of policies of the form
β(e)=γ0 for all e ∈ [e,e 1),β (e)=γ for all e ∈ [e1,e 2),a n dβ(e)=0for all e ∈ [e2,e],
with γ0 >γ , for which equation (8) holds (where we substitute t/θ by γ0). We want to
show that γ0 = t/θ cannot be optimal within this class of policies (hence, it cannot be
optimal in general). A marginal change in e1 accompanied by the corresponding change









e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
.












posed marginal change in e1 will result in a change in costs of h(e1)(γ0 − γ)∂e1.
By the same reasons as in Claim 2, a marginal increase in e1 would decrease the costs
whenever e1 <e ∗ and γ0 >γ .In particular, the policy where γ0 = t/θ cannot be optimal,
since there is room to decrease γ0 and increase e1, which lowers the cost of the monitoring.
Claim 4:A policy such that e1 = e2 >e ∗ and γ<t / θis not optimal.
26T h ep r oo fi st h es a m ea st h ep r oo fo fC l a i m2.T h ed i ﬀerence is that now h(e e) is positive
since e e>e ∗ Therefore, decreasing e e and increasing γ (when this change is possible, i.e.,
when γ<t / θ ) decreases the costs of the policy.
Claim 5:A policy such that e1 <e 2 is not optimal when e1 ≥ e∗.
To prove this Claim, we consider Program [P00] stated at the beginning of the proof of
Proposition 3. By contradiction, suppose that the optimal e1 is an interior solution (we
already now that e2 < e). Denoting λ ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier of (8) in [P00],t h eﬁrst














































Under Assumption 2, equation (11) is written as:
a +2[ 1− a]e1
[a − b][e1 − e2
1]
=
a +2[ 1− a]e2
[a − b][e2 − e2
2]
,
i.e., [a +2[ 1− a]e1]e2
2−[a +2[ 1− a]e2
1]e2+a[e1 − e2
1]=0 . Easy calculations show that,
when e1 ≥ e∗ the previous equality does not have any solution (in e2)i nt h ei n t e r v a l
(e1,1].
We now complete the proof of the proposition. Claims 3 and 5 allow to state that the
optimal policy has only two regions. Hence, it has the following form: β(e)=b γ for all
e ∈ [e,b e) and β(e)=0for all e ∈ [b e,e], where, given Claims 1 and 2, b e ∈ [e∗,e). Finally,
Claim 4 leaves as the unique candidate the policy proposed in Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . (a) We ﬁrst prove that, given α∗(z), z(e) is the optimal
ﬁrms’ strategy. It is easy to check that b γ<t / θimplies that ﬁrms either will report z = e
or z = z∗, any other possible report is dominated. The expected costs of a ﬁrm with
emissions level e are lower reporting e than z∗ if:
te + b γθ[e − e] <t z
∗ = te +
∆(e∗ − e)
R e∗
e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
,
27i.e., given the characterization of b γ,
∆[e − e]
R e∗




e [F(e;EC) − F(e;ED)]de
,
or e<e ∗.
Since z(e) is optimal for the ﬁrms given α∗(z),t h ep o l i c yα∗(z) achieves the policy
β(e) found in Proposition 4, hence, it is optimal under Assumptions 1 and 2.
(b) In this case, it is immediate to check that ﬁrms’ strategy is optimal given α∗(z)
and that the policy α∗(z) is then optimal.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . The proof follows easily from Proposition 5.




s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e























Following the same steps as in Proposition 4, there exists a solution to the previous
program that takes on at most one value γ diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ. Also, the policy









































de.( 1 2 )
w h e r ew eh a v ed e n o t e dF(e;EM) ≡ G(∆n)F(e;EC)+[ 1− G(∆n)]F(e;ED). We note
that the distribution function F(e;EM) is the cumulative distribution function of a linear





F(e;EC) − F(e;ED) R e
e [F(x;EC) − F(x;ED)]dx
F(e;E
M).
28Under Assumption 2, hn(e) is ﬁrst negative and then positive. We denote by en the cut-oﬀ
level such that hn(en)=0 .12 It is easily checked that en <e ∗.
From now on, we can follow the same steps as in Claims 1 to 5 in the proof of
Proposition 4, where we have to consider ∆n instead of ∆,e n instead of e∗,a n dhn()
instead of h(). The claims lead to the following unique candidate policy:






de,t h e n:
β
n(e)=b γ
n for all e ∈ [e,e
n),
β
n(e)=0for all e ∈ [e




















n(e)=t/θ for all e ∈ [e,b e
n),
β
n(e)=0for all e ∈ [b e











Given the previous function β
n(e), we follow the same steps as in the proof of Propo-
s i t i o n5t os h o wt h a tt h ef u n c t i o nαn(z) corresponds to β
n(e).T h e c u t - o ﬀ value zn
that appears in the Proposition corresponds to the report that makes a ﬁrm whose re-
alized emission is en indiﬀerent between reporting 0 (and being monitored with prob-
ability b γ
n) and reporting zn and avoiding monitoring. That is, zn is characterized by
te + b γ
nθ[en − e]=tzn.
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